ABSTRACT In this article, we explore the typological distinction between primary and secondary states. We outline a methodology for exploring variability in the formation and organization of secondary states that integrates aspects of traditional neoevolutionary approaches, Marcus's "dynamic model," Blanton et al.'s "dual-processual model," and world-systems theory. We discuss the development of the Minoan and Mycenaean states of the Bronze Age Aegean and argue that they arose via different mechanisms of secondary state formation, through direct and indirect contact with neighboring societies in the Eastern Mediterranean, Near East, and Egypt. We argue that a model that measures state formation along several different theoretical dimensions encourages archaeological exploration of secondary states along varied historical trajectories, in different (pre)historic contexts.
we outline integrates aspects of traditional, neoevolutionary approaches that emphasize notions of hierarchy (e.g., Flannery 1995) with Joyce Marcus's (1993, 1998) "dynamic model" of state evolution, world-systems theory (e.g., Kardulias 1999a Kardulias , 1999b Kardulias , 2001 Stein 1999) , and dual-processual approaches that incorporate notions of heterarchy and factional competition (e.g., Blanton et al. 1996; Brumfiel 1994; Crumley 1995; Feinman 2000; Mills 2000) . We discuss this methodology with reference to the development of the Minoan and Mycenaean states of the Aegean Bronze Age, whose relationship to the older states of southwest Asia and northeastern Africa has been the topic of much controversy (Figures 1 and 2 ; Table 1 ; see Davis 2001; Galaty and Parkinson 1999) . When compared to states in other regions, the formal characteristics of Minoan and Mycenaean states suggest that they are most similar to secondary states that formed via long-distance interaction with larger societies that had developed complex economic and political systems hundreds-if not thousands-of years before, and that themselves had undergone several changes in state organization.
Our study of Minoan and Mycenaean states suggests that two factors have had a significant impact on the developmental history and organization of secondary states in general: (1) the structure of local social systems prior to and during state formation, and (2) the degree and type of interaction between the nascent state and its neighbors. The Aegean examples suggest that societies that begin with larger, corporate social groups and which interact indirectly with more complex states are more likely to develop heterarchical, or corporate, systems of state-level social organization, whereas societies that begin with smaller, corporate social groups and which interact directly with more complex states are more likely to develop hierarchical, networked systems.
SECONDARY STATES IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Only a select few archaic states were in any sense "pristine" in developmental terms. The vast majority of state societies were, in some sense, secondary or derivative. But most archaeological models of state formation and development approach states as though they were all, indeed, pristine. As a result, most neoevolutionary models (e.g., Carneiro 1970; Flannery 1995; Johnson 1987; Wright 1978 Wright , 1986 Wright , 1998 sought to understand how the political, economic, and other organizational structures of non-(or pre-) state societies, such as "chiefdoms," were reorganized to form the earliest, "primary" states (see Yoffee 2005) . Comparatively fewer models have been proposed to explain the development of secondary states, perhaps because the traditional archaeological tendency to search for "firsts" would make a project looking for "seconds" seem decidedly boring. In fact, confusion about the meaning of the term secondary has led to a general presumption that if states were "secondary," their formation did not need to be explained-or, tautologically, that the existence of such polities can be explained simply by the fact that they were secondary.
The basic distinction between primary and secondary states outlined by Morton Fried (1960 :713, 1967 continues to be made, despite calls to abandon neoevolutionary categories-such as that of "the state" itselfaltogether (e.g., Feinman and Neitzel 1984) . Fried's initial typology was developed into a formal explanatory model by Barbara Price (1978) , who distinguished between two forms of secondary state: those that developed via historical succession from a preexisting state, and those that formed via interaction between less and more politically complex societies. Among these latter "secondary-via-interaction" states, Price identified two subtypes that she understood as poles on a continuum: one that required direct political or economic incorporation or takeover by an outside power, and another that involved indirect transformations of existing socioeconomic and political institutions. Our primary goal here is to reconsider the concept of secondary state formation specifically in light of recent, general models of state formation. We contend that a wider notion of secondary states, based on Price's (1978) typology, can be especially useful for classifying and comparing the many different kinds of contexts in which such states have formed.
MODELING SECONDARY STATES IN ARCHAEOLOGICAL CONTEXTS
Whereas many cultural anthropologists in the last few decades have rejected social typologies, most archaeologists continue to use them, in particular because they facilitate cross-cultural, diachronic analyses (see Fowles 2002; Parkinson 2002b) . At a recent School of American Research (SAR) seminar on archaic states, for example, some of the participants suggested that the following characteristics are useful in distinguishing archaic states from other kinds of societies with institutionalized ranking, such as chiefdoms (Marcus and Feinman 1998:6-7): r four-tiered settlement hierarchy; r three or more decision-making levels; r an ideology of stratification and descent that separates rulers and the elite from commoners; r endogamous social strata that separate the ruling class from the ruled; r the formalization of a ruler's official residence as a "palace"; r a government that employs legal force; and r governmental laws and the ability to enforce them.
Not all of these criteria were supported by all the participants at the SAR symposium, but Joyce Marcus and Gary Feinman note that "a degree of support generally was found for each" (1998:7) .
The criteria outlined by Marcus and Feinman represent well how archaeologists have come to approach the concept of "the state"-not as a discrete, uniform, social type but, rather, as a general developmental stage some societies, although not others, experience. Central to it still is a basic notion of hierarchical organization and political stratification.
Some archaeologists have sought to de-emphasize traditional notions of "hierarchy" and "stratification," while emphasizing the roles of individual agents (e.g., Baines and Yoffee 1998; Cowgill 2004) . Their models attempt to explain decentralized forms of social organization in some complex societies that do not fit the traditional models of hierarchical political organization-those proposed by Marshall Sahlins (1961) , Fried (1960 Fried ( , 1967 , and Elman Service (1971) , for instance. Two good examples of this approach are "heterarchy," introduced to archaeology by Carole Crumley (1995) , Janet Levy (1995) , and Liz Brumfiel (1994) , and "dual-processual" theory, proposed by Richard Blanton, Gary Feinman, and others (Blanton et al. 1996) .
Although the heterarchy-dual-processual framework is an important contribution to more traditional notions of state organization, it does not relate directly either to the analysis of social change over time or to the relationship between a society and its contemporary neighbors. To explore more fully the temporal and spatial dimensions of variability, it is useful to integrate aspects of both Marcus's dynamic model of state trajectories, which allows variability to be modeled over long periods of time, and world-systems theory, which allows the spatial relationships between different societies to be studied and articulated. When integrated with the secondary state model, these varied analytical perspectives allow a more complete understanding of state formation and evolution than any one of them operating alone.
Heterarchy and Dual-Processual Frameworks
Heterarchy theory is proposed as an alternative to traditional perceptions of hierarchy, and it emphasizes the decentralized nature of power, which is thought to alternate between different groups or members in a society (Crumley 1995) . Dual-processual frameworks are not proposed as an alternative to traditional perceptions of hierarchy; rather, they are meant to expose variability within and between different forms of hierarchical and heterarchical organization. Within the dual-processual framework, leaders are thought to employ different kinds of political-economic strategies that occur on a continuum from extremely centralized and exclusionary "network" strategies to much more decentralized inclusive "corporate" strategies. This corporatenetwork continuum crosscuts the traditional axis of hierarchical complexity (Blanton et al. 1996; Feinman et al. 2000 ; see also Dietler's [1999:138] application of Sahlins's [1985] concepts of "praxiological" versus divine kingship societies).
Along this continuum, the network-or exclusionarymode emphasizes personal prestige, wealth exchange, individualized power accumulation, elite aggrandizement, lineal patterns of inheritance and descent (e.g., patriarchy), particularizing ideologies, personal networks, and the specialized (frequently attached) manufacture of status-related craft goods (Feinman 2000:214) . This is the mode typically associated with traditional models of hierarchical societies. Network-based societies are frequently small in scale, with archaeological evidence for individualizing, prestige-good exchange systems, and "princely" burials.
The corporate mode, by contrast, emphasizes staple food production, communal ritual, public construction, shared power, large cooperative labor tasks, social segments that are woven together through broad, integrative ritual and ideological means, and suppressed economic differentiation (Feinman 2000:214) . Such societies can be very large in scale, with archaeological evidence for large-scale architectural achievements but "faceless" or invisible leaders. This corporate mode situates heterarchy in a theoretical framework within which corporate-or inclusivebehavior is not opposed to traditional notions of hierarchy but, rather, is an expression of a specific kind of hierarchy or a lack thereof.
In their initial presentation of the dual-processual model, Blanton and colleagues (1996) suggested that the Early and Middle Formative periods in Mesoamerica were characterized by network strategies, whereas the Teotihuacan polity during the Classic period was characterized by corporate strategies. The lowland Maya area, by contrast, was characterized during the Classic period by networkbased city-states.
The authors, both in that initial publication and in several subsequent publications (e.g., Feinman 2000; Feinman et al. 2000) , have gone out of their way to make clear that many, if not most, of the ideas drawn into the dual-processual framework are not new. Indeed, those working in the Aegean will recognize the similarities between this model and Colin Renfrew's (most recently, 2001 ) model of individualizing versus group-oriented chiefdoms. Furthermore, despite Blanton et al.'s (1996) repeated assertions that the network-corporate distinction occurs along a social continuum, the model has come to be used as a typological scheme (Kintigh 2000) . Nevertheless, when integrated with additional, more flexible models of state formation, including both Marcus's dynamic model, which emphasizes long-term variability, and world-systems theoretical approaches, which elucidate the nature of interaction between different kinds of societies, it can serve as a powerful and very useful explanatory device. Marcus (e.g., 1993 Marcus (e.g., , 1998 has developed a dynamic model for exploring long-term temporal variability in the organization of states. Her model focuses on the cycles of consolidation, expansion, and dissolution that states experience through time as specific centers extend their authority over formerly autonomous regions and then lose it. Marcus proposes this model in lieu of models that contrast large, unitary, "territorial states" with smaller "city-states." Rather than contrasting these different sociopolitical types, Marcus encourages us to think of them as "different stages in the dynamic cycles of the same states" (1998:92) . Similar models have been proposed for explaining long-term variability in chiefdom (Anderson 1990 ) and tribal (Parkinson 2002a ) societies, indicating that similar trajectories of integrationalbeit not subjugation-can be identified in less complex and unranked social contexts, as well.
The Dynamic Model of State Trajectories
Marcus's dynamic model gets around the typological fuzziness surrounding primary and secondary states by referring to "first-," "second-," or "third-generation" states depending on the timing of their appearance in a particular region. This important methodological device permits one to distinguish between primary states-specifically, "pristine, first-generation" states-and states that appeared first in particular regions but were not pristine. Such states are "first generation" but are often formed as a result of various primary or secondary (sensu Price 1978) processes.
This focus on the long-term historical dynamics of societies in specific regions brings an important temporal dimension to the study of variability in state societies. Although the dynamic model is not appropriate to the study of precise patterns of cross-cultural variability in different regions, it does provide an excellent framework for discussing general evolutionary trends in different areas. To this end, it can be used alongside other approaches to develop more explicit models of social organization and change.
World-Systems Frameworks
Although the perspectives discussed above permit social variability to be modeled along organizational (hierarchical and heterarchical) and temporal dimensions, they do not allow one to place states within wider panregional contexts. To this end, it is useful to incorporate aspects of world-systems theory-in particular, the specific form of world-systems theory that has been applied to prehistoric archaeological contexts.
In its initial formulation (i.e., Wallerstein 1974), the world-systems concept was intended to model interaction between culturally different societies linked via the vital exchange of food and raw materials (Chase-Dunn and Grimes 1995:389). Immanuel Wallerstein was concerned particularly with the nature of interaction between different kinds of state and nonstate societies. He focused on the tendency of more powerful cores to exploit less powerful peripheries. In ancient times, this resulted in the formation of world empires such as ancient Rome and China. In modern times, world economic systems have formed through which hegemonic core states, such as 19th-century Britain, have exploited cheap labor and resources in peripheral territories. World economies are less politically centralized than were their imperial predecessors.
Although Wallerstein's initial model was designed explicitly to deal with very recent or modern capitalist systems, several authors have adapted the initial model to different historical contexts including smaller, noncapitalist systems, effectively extending the applicability of the model several thousand years into the past (e.g., ChaseDunn and Hall 1993; Frank and Gills 1993; Friedman 1979; Kristiansen 1987; Schneider 1977 ; see Chase-Dunn and Grimes 1995 for discussion). A critical shift in these adaptations has been a reworking of the model such that it no longer refers explicitly to staple goods only but also accommodates the transfer of "prestige" goods as well.
Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas Hall prefer a general definition of world-systems that facilitates comparisons of interactions between societies of dramatically different political and economic organization:
We define world-systems as intersocietal networks in which the interactions (e.g., trade, warfare, intermarriage) are important for the reproduction of the internal structures of the composite units and importantly affect changes that occur in these local structures. [1993:855] This definition encompasses interactions between states and stateless societies by approaching world-systems from a broad-brush, admittedly coarse-lumping, perspective. This effectively extends the world-systems umbrella to cover nearly any kind of interpolity interaction (symmetrical, asymmetrical, hierarchical, exploitative, etc.) .
Although these revisions to Wallerstein's initial formulation of the model dilute its descriptive and explanatory power (see Cherry 1999:20-21) , they nevertheless allow interactions between societies with different levels of political and economic complexity to be identified. In particular, they allow these interactions to be modeled on a general level within a cross-cultural framework. When used in concert with the different theoretical perspectives discussed above, we believe the world-systems perspective can add another, spatial dimension to the analysis of temporal and structural variability in state societies.
MODELS OF STATE FORMATION IN THE AEGEAN BRONZE AGE
Most scholars have recognized that the Mycenaean states of the Late Bronze Age owe much to their Minoan predecessors, but models of Minoan state formation in Bronze Age Crete have vacillated between those that emphasize indigenous development in the absence of external influences (e.g., Branigan 1988 Branigan , 1995 Broodbank 1992; Cherry 1984; Dabney 1995; Renfrew 1972; Warren 1987) and those that, following Arthur Evans (1964) , emphasize their purely secondary-in this case meaning "derivative"-nature (e.g., Watrous 1987; cf. Watrous 1994) . Occasionally, models incorporate both indigenous and derived change (e.g., Manning 1994; Schoep 2006) .
Throughout most of the 20th century, when notions of ex oriente lux defined European prehistory (e.g., Childe 1951), the predominant paradigm held that the Minoan states of Middle and Late Minoan Crete were byproducts-if not actual colonies of-Egyptian and SyroPalestinian state-level societies. From this perspective, the origin of the states in the Bronze Age Aegean did not need to be questioned or explored; they were simply secondary (i.e., "derivative") and therefore not in need of explanation.
In the 1970s and 1980s, this perspective gave way to one that emphasized the indigenous nature of state formation in the Aegean. Beginning with Renfrew's (1972) publication of Emergence of Civilisation, and subsequent articles by John Cherry (e.g., 1978 Cherry (e.g., , 1983 Cherry (e.g., , 1984 , the states of Minoan Crete came to be viewed as locally inspired and distinctive developments that formed more-or-less independently of their Near Eastern and Egyptian counterparts, almost as though they were themselves "primary" states (see discussion and review in Bennet and Galaty 1997:84-87) .
This "indigenous" perspective encouraged Aegean prehistorians to bring data to bear on the precise nature of state development in the region, based on careful excavation and survey. In fact, much of this research has continued to demonstrate that the states of the Aegean Bronze Age were quite different from primary states in other parts of the world. Among other characteristics, they were considerably smaller than most primary states such as those in the Valley of Mexico, the Valley of Oaxaca, Predynastic Egypt, or Uruk Mesopotamia, each of which boasted large primary centers that grew quickly and extended their authority over a very large territory. Although some Aegean Bronze Age states exhibit a primate rank-size distribution (e.g., Small 1999) , Aegean state territories are significantly smaller than those of most primary, first-generation states in other parts of the world (cf. Johnson 1980) .
The states of the Aegean Bronze Age do not fit expectations about how primary states should evolve because they were not, in fact, primary states. They were secondary, first-generation states that developed at the edges of older, more mature state societies in the Near East and Africa. By integrating aspects of the various theoretical perspectives discussed above, we outline in more detail the relationships that existed between the Aegean and the Near East and Africa. When viewed as secondary and first generation, the Minoan and Mycenaean states bear demonstrable similarities in form to such states in other parts of the world.
RETHINKING MINOAN AND MYCENAEAN STATE FORMATION
Previous attempts to model prehistoric trajectories of political change in the Aegean Bronze Age have been hindered by a tendency to privilege certain causal factors at the expense of others (e.g., Halstead's [1995] focus on "social storage" and redistribution) and to view state formation in the Aegean either as exclusively indigenous or as a direct product of diffusion. Here we offer an approach that models Aegean social organization from several different temporal, structural, and scalar perspectives and more precisely delineates the nature of interactions between the Aegean states and their eastern counterparts. The basic model can be summarized as follows (see, again, Figures 1-2 r As the Minoan palatial societies developed, they were integrated into a network of interaction that extended from Anatolia and the Near East, including Cyprus and Egypt. In world-systems jargon, they became a periphery of the Near Eastern and Egyptian core states. Direct contact between these core states and incipient hierarchical societies on the Greek mainland was truncated.
r In the Neopalatial (Second Palace) period (1680-1415 B.C.E.), Minoan states became active participants in this interregional system. At the same time, they established themselves as a local, semiperipheral core within the Aegean, whereas the Greek mainland became a periphery.
r As more mature Minoan economic and political systems developed during the Neopalatial period, the nature of Minoan interaction with the Greek mainland, and between the Greek mainland and the states of the Eastern Mediterranean, Near East, and Egypt, shifted. Emergent elite on the Greek mainland began to negotiate more directly with the Eastern Mediterranean, Near Eastern, and Egyptian elite, cutting out Minoan middlemen.
r Near the start of the Late Bronze Age (ca. 1650-1100 B.C.E.), the Minoan palace system collapsed. Competing lineages on the Greek mainland co-opted several organizational features of Minoan state systems, resulting in the rapid development of the Mycenaean states.
The Emergence of the Minoan States
The earliest states on Crete were first-generation, secondary states that developed via interaction with more mature state systems in Egypt and the Near East. The earliest Minoan states were much smaller than primary states in other parts of the world. They all developed at roughly the same time and exhibited astonishing similarities in geographic scale, settlement distribution, bureaucratic organization, and ground plan of public architecture. Perhaps most importantly, they were not preceded by a period of competing chiefdoms such as that which characterizes the developmental trajectory of many states in other parts of the world, including the Greek mainland. Rather, they developed ex nihilo at the beginning of the second millennium from some sort of "ranked lineage" system (Haggis 1999) , through competition between relatively large "tribal" groups (see Parkinson 2002b for definition of the term tribe). We propose that the nonhierarchical organization of these segmentary "tribal" groups contributed to the corporate (sensu Blanton et al. 1996) organization of the palaces themselves (Haggis 1999 (Haggis , 2002 .
Evidence that the Minoan states of the Protopalatial (Old Palace) period emerged from earlier (Prepalatial) tribal groups on the periphery of the larger Mediterranean worldsystem is derived from analyses of settlement and mortuary patterns, writing systems, and regional exchange (see Haggis 1999 and Schoep 2006 for similar, regional approaches to the Pre-and Protopalatial periods on Crete).
The mortuary evidence from Prepalatial Crete, circa 3100-2000 B.C.E., includes large, multiple inhumation tombs (i.e., house, chamber, and tholos [corbelled or "beehive"] tombs). These tombs may indicate incipient patterns of hereditary social ranking of corporate lineages (Haggis 1999:68), but there is no evidence to suggest social rank was associated with centralized economic or political control throughout most of the island.
Some areas on Crete boast larger sites than others, and there is evidence for settlement nucleation in some areas (Haggis 1999:64-65) , but no Prepalatial site was larger than five hectares in size (Driessen 2001:61) ; the average settlement consisted of seven houses and was 0.16 hectares (Haggis 1999:65) . Sites such as Malia, and possibly Knossos and Palaikastro, had central buildings that may have been associated with a nascent administrative organization. But few of the seal stones and seal imprints from these sites, which Ilse Schoep (1999, 2006:44-45) associates with Prepalatial administration, were found in direct association with central buildings. Ceramic (Day and Wilson 1998; Day et al. 1997; Knappett 1999) , mortuary (Watrous 1994) , and writing styles (Schoep 1999 (Schoep :265, 2002 (Schoep :99, 2006 varied geographically across the island.
Although ceramic, mortuary, and writing styles were sometimes shared between regions, we think it likely that Prepalatial Crete was home to several discrete tribal groups. At some sites, such as Malia, Knossos, and Palaikastro, each of which presumably occupied different tribal territories, leaders may have exerted some level of political and economic control over others (perhaps at the "chiefdom" level; Haggis 1999:72-73) , but their main source of power appears to have come through manipulation of ideology and ritual (Haggis 1999:73; Schoep 2006:48-49) . Interregional exchange between Crete and the Cyclades, mainland Greece, and, importantly, Egypt and the Near East (in particular with the Levantine city-states, such as Alalakh, Byblos, Ebla, Qatna, and Ugarit; Schoep 2006:53, figure 10 ) increased dramatically during the Pre-and Protopalatial periods (Broodbank 2000; Mountjoy 1998) , perhaps because of the introduction of masted, plank-built sailing ships (Cherry 1984:36) . Following Mary Helms (1988) , Schoep (2006:52-57) argues that budding Minoan elite sought exotic goods, knowledge, and technology to legitimize new forms of ideological, political, and economic power.
Islandwide regional variability continued into the Protopalatial period, circa 2000-1680 B.C.E. (see Table 2 and Figure 3 ). Although the primary centers were all very similar, aspects of administration and exchange continued to vary from region to region. Recent discussions of the Protopalatial states have tended to view them as heterarchically organized polities (e.g., Schoep 2002) . Along the corporatenetwork continuum (Blanton et al. 1996) , the states of this period seem to fall more on the corporate end. Evidence in support of this view includes the lack of iconography representing specific, named rulers, and the lack of evidence for centralized control of production and exchange, as demonstrated by Carl Knappet's (1999) work at Malia and Myrtos-Pyrgos. Rather, the nature of political authority within the first Minoan states seems to have stemmed from a shared, Prepalatial ideology. Peter Day and David Wilson (2002) have drawn very similar conclusions about Pre-and Protopalatial Knossos; nascent elite legitimized their growing power through manipulation of ideology and ritual activity (see also Haggis 1999; Knappett and Schoep 2000) and through controlled distribution of material goods needed to perform rituals. Importantly, many Prepalatial, ritually charged items-such as obsidian and bronze-were acquired off-island in the Cyclades and entered Crete via the port at Poros-Katsambas (Day and Wilson 2002:152-154) . Control of exotic materials thereby paved the way, at Knossos first and at other central places later, for the first palaces and a palatial elite.
Although the Protopalatial centers on Crete were very large compared to their predecessors on the island (e.g., Knossos = 45 ha, Malia = 60 ha), the sites were small when compared to the urban centers of most primary, pristine, first-generation states in the world. For example, Uruk reached a size of circa 450 hectares in the Late Uruk period (Nissen 1988:72) . Teotihuacan, during the Tzacualli Period (C.E. 1-C.E. 100), reached a size of 20 square kilometers and had a population of 80,000 or more (Blanton et al. 1981:129) . But, as Keith Branigan (2001) recently has noted, the centers on Crete were not much smaller, at least in the Neopalatial period, than their contemporary second millennium B.C.E. neighbors in the Near East such as Ur (60 ha) or Ashkelon (50 ha)-centers of second-or thirdgeneration, secondary-via-history states much further along in their (quite different) developmental trajectories.
Not only were the Minoan states more similar to second-or third-generation states elsewhere, the sizes of the Minoan polities themselves were small and similar in size and organization to each other, making them more analogous to Bruce Trigger's "city-states," such as the Classic Maya, than to larger "territorial states" (1993:9-11), such as Dynastic Egypt. We suggest this is because first-generation primary states tend to develop into large, primate, "territorial states" (in Trigger's terms, see also Marcus 2003) , whereas first-generation secondary states develop through a wider variety of different developmental processes. During the Neopalatial (New Palace) period, circa 1680-1415, palatial architecture became standardized across the island (Cunningham 2001) . At the same time, administrative and writing systems became standardized (Schoep 1999 (Schoep , 2001 , and similar Minoan ceramic styles were more widely distributed (Dickinson 1994:115) . Similar settlement patterns in different regions across the island-three tiers of hierarchy in most regions (Driessen 2001 ) and nucleation at Neopalatial centers (Whitelaw 2001 )-and the ubiquitous occurrence of Linear A is additional evidence for the hitherto unprecedented expansion of palatial authority into spheres of economic and political life (Knappett and Schoep 2000) . This pattern is associated temporally with increasing nucleation at primary centers and a reorganization of mortuary practices to include-at the largest primary center, Knossos-customs that emphasize the individual as opposed to the corporate unit (Rehak and Younger 1998:110-111) .
We suggest the foregoing processes can be associated with the establishment during the Neopalatial period of regional economic and political systems that increasingly were controlled by smaller corporate groups, or perhaps specific lineages, which occupied the palace structures at central places. Although the nature of authority in Protopalatial Crete may initially have been maintained through control of ideology and ritual, during the Neopalatial period a more established (and at some palaces, more centralized) economic and political system developed (Knappett and Schoep 2000) . This is very evident at Neopalatial Knossos, in particular when compared to other central places, such as Malia, where power continued to be shared (Adams 2006:22-23) .
From a dual-processual perspective, Neopalatial Crete can be placed somewhere in the middle of the corporatenetwork continuum (see Table 2 and Figure 3) . Neopalatial states clearly possessed several corporate characteristics, including a lack of representation of specific rulers. In other ways, however, they incorporated aspects of networkbased organization. These include changes in mortuary contexts, which in some areas emphasized individuals or specific lineages. The shift toward nucleation and expansion of palatial authority into the economic sector also marks a trend toward centralization, at Knossos in particular. In some regions, economic (and political) power was exercised via second-order centers creating enhanced regional integration (Knappett and Schoep 2000:367) . Perhaps most indicative of networked-based strategies is the increase in gift giving between Minoan elite and their contemporaries, both on the Greek mainland and in the larger world-system (Rehak and Younger 1998:136) .
From a world-systems perspective, the organizational changes that occurred during the Neopalatial period accompany a shift in Crete's position in the eastern Mediterranean interaction sphere. In the Protopalatial period, Crete operated on the periphery of the Near Eastern and Egyptian cores, but in the Neopalatial period, the island filled a semiperipheral position between the Near East and Egypt and the emergent centers on the Greek mainland. During this transition, the Minoan states established themselves as local cores that extended their influence into the southern Aegean (Kardulias 1999a) . Nick Kardulias's concept of "negotiated peripherality" is particularly useful for understanding the changing nature of the relationship between the Minoan and Mycenaean states and their Near Eastern and Egyptian counterparts (Kardulias 1999b (Kardulias , 2001 ; see also Morris 1999) . In contrast to the original world-systems model of Wallerstein (1974) , which emphasized the exploitive relationship between dominating cores and passive peripheries, the concept of "negotiated peripherality" captures the active roles played by people living outside the core (Hall 1986) . Kardulias defined negotiated peripherality as follows: the willingness and ability of individuals in peripheries to determine the conditions under which they will engage in trade, ceremonial exchange, intermarriage, adoption of outside religious and political ideologies, etc. with representatives of expanding states. [Kardulias 2001:1] The evidence for long-distance and regional exchange in Protopalatial and Neopalatial Crete suggests a gradual development of increasing trade contacts dominated by the emergent elite on the island. Rather than indicating a oneway exploitive relationship between Crete and the Near Eastern and Egyptian core states, the archaeological data suggest that elite in both the peripheral and core areas were actively pursuing trade to acquire low-bulk, high-value items associated with social prestige and political power. Although initially these items may have entered the Cretan system through-and thus have indicated prestige forlarger corporate groups, by the Neopalatial period they seem to have been associated more closely with specific individuals or lineages.
During the Neopalatial period, when trade contacts with the Eastern Mediterranean increased considerably (Cline 1994 (Cline :10, 1999 cf. Knappett and Schoep 2000:369) , the range of exchange items expanded to include not only "trinkets" associated with social prestige but also crucial bulk "commodities," including copper oxhide ingots and Canaanite jars and their contents (see Manning and Hulin 2005; Mountjoy 1998; Sherratt and Sherratt 1991; Sherratt 1999 Sherratt , 2001 . By this point in time, Cyprus was functioning as a semiperipheral intermediary between the Aegean and the Near East, a position Crete eventually filled as well (Muhly 2003; Rehak and Younger 1998: 136) .
At the same time that the Neopalatial polities of Minoan Crete were becoming semiperipheries of the eastern Mediterranean world-system, they began to establish themselves as a local core area and developed contacts with the Greek mainland (Kardulias 1999a) . In contrast to the Protopalatial Period, for which evidence of contact between Crete and the Greek mainland consists almost exclusively of ceramics (Korres 1983; Rutter and Zerner 1984) initially in coastal areas, then further inland-Neopalatial exchange extended to other types of material culture, including lapis Lacedaemonius from Laconia for the production of stone bowls. The raw material that seems to have tied the whole exchange system together, however, was metal (Muhly 2003; Rehak and Younger 1998:135-137) .
For the Minoan elite to gain semiperipheral status in the larger Mediterranean world-system, they had to build social and trade connections with the emergent elite on the Greek mainland, as indicated by the Minoan styles of metal vessels present in the Shaft Graves (so-called because traditional cist graves were extended deeply into bedrock and burials were placed at the bottom of the shaft) at Mycenae (Wright 1995:8) , as well as by the earliest tholos tombs in Messenia, which adopted burial techniques long associated with ranking in the Mesara Plain of Crete (Bennet 1999) .
Just as the Minoan elite had actively sought longdistance trading contacts with the more mature states of Egypt and the Near East (i.e., Kardulias's concept of "negotiated peripherality"), the emergent Mycenaean elite on the mainland similarly sought to control the exchange of prestige goods with the now-mature states on Crete (Shear 2004; Voutsaki 2001; Wolpert 2004) . In contrast to the development of long-distance exchange networks on Crete, which emerged de novo during the Protopalatial period, the emergent elite on the Greek mainland based their trade contacts with the Minoans on preestablished systems of exchange through the western Cyclades (i.e., the "western string," see Davis 1979) .
The Emergence of the Mycenaean States
Early Bronze Age (3100-2000 B.C.E.) social complexity on the Greek mainland-marked by settlement hierarchies (Pullen 1994b; Wiencke 1989) and relatively large, nucleated, primary centers organized around "corridor houses" (Pullen 1994a; Shaw 1987; Themelis 1984) -collapsed following Early Helladic II, and again after Early Helladic III (Forsén 1992) . After the second collapse, trajectories of mainland social development took a very different historical turn than they had on Crete.
In contrast to the Minoan example, where centralized Protopalatial polities developed relatively quickly from Prepalatial tribal roots, the incipient ranked-or perhaps fully ranked-mainland polities gave way during the Middle Bronze Age (2000-1650 B. C.E.) to a dispersed settlement system with only a few large, usually fortified sites (Rutter 1993; Wright 1995:7) and burials in large tumuli (Müller 1989 ). Long-distance trade decreased and what trade continued-of gold mica ware pottery (Rutter 1993:775-777) and andesite (Runnels 1988) , for instancewas perhaps funneled through the large site of Kolonna on the island of Aegina (Tartaron et al. 2006) . During the Late Bronze Age, the mainland saw the rapid development of states with centralized economic and political systems that eventually came to dominate trade throughout the region. Wealthy burial of elite individuals in shaft graves and tholos tombs appeared at the end of the Middle Helladic and continued at central places through the Late Bronze Age (ca. 1650-1100 B.C.E.; see Wright 1995) . As Jeremy Rutter noted, tholos tombs likely derived from tumuli:
In all likelihood, the Mycenaean tholos represents the merging of a mainland tradition of burial below ground surface in pits, cists, and small chambers set into a low tumulus, on the one hand, and on the other, a Minoan tradition of burial above ground in large circular tomb chambers with corbelled side walls. [1993:789] Rutter (1993:789) further noted that not only are Late Helladic burial styles indicative of the adoption of Minoan systems of iconography and symbols of power, the motifs that decorate the burial goods in the tombs are derived from Minoan art.
In contrast to the Minoan trajectory, however, where the nature of political authority seems to have been more ideological in nature, social differentiation and prestige on the Greek mainland always had a direct association with economic control (see Table 2 and Figure 3 ). This different focus ultimately produced the strongly networked, as opposed to corporate, states of the Mycenaean period (Galaty 1999; Galaty and Parkinson 1999; Wright 2004) .
The shifts in settlement organization and trade networks that had occurred by the end of the Early Helladic may have been caused by, at least in part, the monopolization of long-distance trade contacts by the emergent Minoan elite on Crete, thereby cutting the Early Bronze Age mainland elite out of the loop. By the Neopalatial period, Crete occupied a semiperipheral position in the Eastern Mediterranean world-system and elite on the Greek mainland gained status not through direct trade with core elite but, rather, via Minoan intermediaries. The close proximity of mainland centers to Crete, however, resulted in the co-opting not only of symbols of power but also systems of bureaucratic administration and economic organization on the mainland (Driessen 1998-99) . This close interaction, combined with an earlier tendency toward ranking, resulted in the rapid development of the highly centralized, "network-based" Mycenaean states at the start of the Late Helladic III period.
The beginning of the Late Helladic period on the Greek mainland, circa 1650 B.C.E., also marked the reintegration of that region into a sphere of interregional and foreign exchange. Eric Cline (1994) catalogued all of the artifacts that were manufactured beyond the Mycenaean cultural area (i.e., in Anatolia, the Levant, and Mesopotamia) and which were discovered in Late Bronze Age Aegean contexts. In stark contrast to the dearth of evidence for foreign exchange during the Early Helladic and Middle Helladic periods, the Late Helladic period marks the beginning of a trend toward increased contact between the Greek mainland, Crete, and the Eastern Mediterranean, Near East, and Egypt. Contact is associated directly with the representation of political prestige, both in the shaft graves and in tholos tombs in the early Late Helladic period and at the primary Mycenaean centers, where "palaces" were constructed (Shear 2004) .
Whereas most discussions have tended to view the increase in interregional trade during the Late Helladic period on the mainland as a result of the development of the economically and politically centralized Mycenaean states, we suggest that the increase in trade may actually have caused, at least in part, the development of these societies in the first place. In particular, we suggest that the disenfranchised chiefs of the Middle Helladic began actively to seek trade relationships with Minoan, and more distant, elite.
The development of external trade relations was critical to the legitimization of incipient elite authority in several parts of the world and likely was critical to the establishment of the authority of Early Helladic II elite as well (see Flannery 1968; Helms 1988 Helms , 1993 Spencer 1993) . But the Early Helladic trade networks were disrupted during the Middle Helladic period, in part because of Aegean trade monopolies established by the emergent Minoan elite on Crete. From a world-systems perspective, the establishment of the Protopalatial centers on Crete marked their integration into a negotiated-peripheral relationship with the more mature states of the Near East and Egypt. At the same time, the Greek mainland was denied these same trade contacts, perhaps undermining the symbolic authority of emergent mainland leaders. Not coincidentally, the only location that managed to maintain its position as a seat of regional exchange was Kolonna on Aegina: the same site that exhibited the highest degree of social differentiation during the Middle Helladic period. This differentiation was indicated by the earliest Shaft Grave in the region, replete with ceramics of both Minoan and Cycladic origin, a gold diadem, and a bronze sword, all of which suggested that Kolonna may have been a "chiefdom" or nascent state (Rutter 1993:776) .
As the Minoan palaces gradually extended their authority into the local economies of their immediate hinterlands, they also extended their influence over the Greek mainland, essentially establishing themselves as nearby cores. This influence-more direct than that experienced by the early Minoan states in their relationships to the eastern Mediterranean cores-seems to have helped legitimate elite authority not only at Kolonna but throughout the early Mycenaean world. By the time the Neopalatial Minoan states had negotiated peripheral and local-core status in the Eastern Mediterranean world-system, vis-à-vis the mainland polities, mainland elite were strongly positioned to negotiate as well and to leverage newfound trade connections, quickly creating the multiple, small networked states of the Late Helladic III.
Our brief analysis of Mycenaean states indicates that they experienced a quite different trajectory of state formation than their predecessors on Minoan Crete. In contrast to the corporate-theocratic nature of the Protopalatial states on Crete, the organization of the Mycenaean polities during Late Helladic IIIB on the Greek mainland, as revealed by the Linear B tablets, indicates a desire to control the production and distribution of prestige goods and promote the roles of specific hereditary leaders. We suggest this mainland, network-based system of organization (sensu stricto Blanton et al. 1996) was derived from an historical emphasis on smaller ranked lineages that focused their authority on the control of goods, as well as the adoption of Minoan symbols of prestige used to legitimate and demonstrate political authority. The use of Linear B tablets by the Mycenaean authorities to record the production and distribution of materials indicates the adoption of a system of bureaucratic organization that ultimately originated in the Neopalatial centers of Minoan Crete. In contrast to the Protopalatial centers on Minoan Crete, which only indirectly adopted symbolic elements from their peers in the Near East and Egypt, the Mycenaean centers formed as a result of more direct secondary processes that we attribute to their close geographic proximity to Crete and to negotiated incorporation into the Minoan local periphery during the Neopalatial period.
AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO SECONDARY STATE FORMATION
The foregoing analysis of Aegean state formation incorporates aspects of several different theoretical approaches to model trajectories of Bronze Age social change. In this concluding section, we discuss the implications of this approach for understanding the development of secondary states elsewhere in the world.
We have found it helpful to employ Marcus's dynamic model to refer to the relative maturity of states that occur in a specific region (viz., first-generation, secondgeneration, etc.) . This is somewhat problematic insomuch as we have tried to draw specific chronological lines through what were largely continuous processes. Nevertheless, dynamic modeling is useful as an analytical device, allowing us to refer to the Protopalatial polities on Crete as first-generation ("secondary-by-interaction") states as distinct from their second-generation ("secondary-byhistory") Neopalatial successors (see Table 2 and Figure 3) . We can further differentiate the processes involved in the formation of the Protopalatial centers as having occurred via secondary, indirect interaction with the more mature (third-or fourth-generation, secondary-by-history) states in Egypt and the Levant. Similarly, the Mycenaean states on the Greek mainland were first-generation, secondary-byinteraction states that formed through more direct contacts with the nearby, second-generation Minoan states on Crete.
Implicit in our discussion is the notion that the firstgeneration states on Crete, as well as those on the Greek mainland, formed via secondary-interactive processes: The Protopalatial Minoan states interacted with the states of the Levant and Egypt and incorporated exotic symbols of prestige into an emergent ideology associated with large corporate (i.e., tribal, see Parkinson 2002b) groups; the Mycenaean states experienced direct interaction with both the Neopalatial societies on Crete and, through them, the distant states of the eastern Mediterranean. In each case, secondary interaction involved the incorporation, at varying degrees, of foreign symbols, ideas, and prestige goods into local systems of economic and social organization.
We also have suggested that Mycenaean states were networked and more exclusionary in their organization than were their Minoan predecessors because of the following: (1) a tendency for mainland elite to be concerned with the control and distribution of goods (which began in the Early Bronze Age), whereas the Minoans focused from the start on ideological and ritual control, and (2) the close proximity of the mainland to Crete and the more direct secondary influence of Protopalatial systems of governance and iconography on mainland social evolution. By contrast, because the Prepalatial societies on Crete were both more variable in their social organization, and because they were so distant from the more complex core societies with which they interacted, they incorporated Egyptian and Near Eastern symbols of prestige into a preexisting tribal system that emphasized larger corporate groups. This resulted in the formation of a more "corporate" or "heterarchical" theocratic system.
In their initial application of the "dual-processual" model to Mesoamerica, Blanton and colleagues noted, "Viewed broadly, Mesoamerican social history from the early Early Formative to the Spanish conquest consisted of cycles of long duration alternating between network and corporate emphases" (1996:14-15). They suggested that the cycling between corporate and network ends of the spectrum was not strictly repetitive. Rather, cycles were regionally specific, and social formations changed in scale, integration, and complexity over time. Similar long-term cycling occurred throughout the Aegean from the Bronze Age states discussed here to the more corporately organized polities of the Classical period, during the sixth to fourth centuries B.C.E., reverting again to more network-based systems during the era of Hellenistic imperialism.
With specific regard to secondary state formation, the Aegean Bronze Age patterns suggest that it was the structure of prestate societies (on the corporate-network continuum), combined with the nature of panregional interactions (direct and local vs. indirect and distant), that had the greatest impact on the political and economic organization of first-generation secondary states. Specifically, those prestate societies that were more corporately organized and which interacted only indirectly, and at a distance, with more complex polities were more likely to emerge as corporate-based states that were similar to their neighbors. Those that emphasized exclusionary practices and which were in direct contact with nearby complex polities were more likely to emerge as network-based states that borrowed specific, foreign symbols of prestige and power.
We have found aspects of world-systems theory useful in our attempt to describe these regional and interregional relationships. In particular, we have found Kardulias's (1999b Kardulias's ( , 2001 ; see also Morris 1999) concept of "negotiated peripherality" enlightening. It defines well the origins of the kinds of relationships that most likely existed between "first-generation secondary states," such as the Aegean states, and the more mature states with which they interacted. The model we have outlined here for the Bronze Age is reminiscent of that developed by Ian Morris (1999) , which addresses the Iron Age Aegean. Morris describes how Iron Age Greeks negotiated peripheral relationships with Egypt and the Levant in a manner similar to that of the fledgling states of the Bronze Age.
Finally, Marcus (1993 Marcus ( , 1998 discusses state formation and evolution in terms of periodic consolidation and dissolution, but we have found it more useful to delineate for different states multiple axes of change, in the amount of economic integration they experienced, the size of corporate groups emphasized, and the extent to which they employed ideological control. When viewed in this way, the mainland tendency toward smaller corporate groups, great concern for economic control, and little ideological influence (at least until the development of the "palace" polities in the LH IIIB period) becomes clear. By contrast, on Crete there was a tendency toward larger and more variable corporate groups, and an emphasis on ideological factors (in particular throughout the Protopalatial period), with economic control occurring only in the Neopalatial period.
One question regarding state formation that still lingers regards the distinction Trigger (1993, 2003) has made between large "unitary" or "territorial" states and "citystates" (see also Nichols and Charlton 1997) . The model we have developed suggests that the secondary, firstgeneration states of the Aegean were "city-states," and we wonder whether the distinction Trigger has made may, in fact, be related to the theoretical confusion that surrounds the concept of primary and secondary states, discussed above. Elsewhere, Marcus (1992) and Kent Flannery (1995:18) have suggested that early unitary states in several parts of the world (including in the Valley of Mexico, Mesopotamia, and in the Maya lowlands) were relatively unstable. Although primary states tended to be much larger in scale, they frequently did not last for more than a few hundred years (Marcus 1998) . Second-generation states, by contrast, usually were smaller in scale than their primary predecessors, and they oscillated between periods of dissolution and consolidation, when one state gained control of several others in its vicinity. Because these secondary states formed out of the ashes of larger state systems, they usually were similar in scale and had similar bureaucratic systems, military strategies, ideological systems, and settlement structures. Usually, their centers had similar layouts and their public architecture had similar ground plans (see Flannery 1998) .
One explanation for this pattern might relate to the nature of secondary-state formation. Secondary states formed in two basic manners: as remnants of larger entities that broke up after an initial fluorescence or as competing polities that developed at the edge of more mature complex societies. Both processes involved competition between likesized, similarly organized social units, and therefore both resulted in the adoption of older organizational strategies by new, or emergent, corporate groups. These groups established their authority either through brute force, gift exchange, or ideological mechanisms that served to legitimate authority. The above model suggests that the organizational systems employed by the Aegean states were similar because they formed locally via "peer polity" interaction (Cherry 1986) . These interacting peer polities were themselves similarly organized and experienced secondary interaction with more mature complex societies. This ultimately resulted in both cases in the development of so-called city-states, with similar-albeit not identical-systems of organization.
We suggest that this pattern-of secondary states emerging from groups similar in scale and organizationis to be expected when nascent elite developed systems of prestige and power based at least in part on the borrowing of symbolic and material elements from elsewhere. This explains, for example, the Mycenaean co-opting of Minoan mortuary and architectural features. Similar traditions of architectural similarity can be found in the construction of pyramids at early Maya centers in the Petén, such as El Mirador, Tikal, and Calakmul (Marcus 2004) . These centers all had established contact with the larger, more mature state centered at Teotihuacan, although the nature of that relationship is unclear (see Marcus 2003:92; Braswell 2003) . Linda Schele and Peter Matthews (1998:337) suggest that the Maya adopted Mexican architectural styles and iconography and used them to fit their own needs, a sort of "negotiated peripherality." Similar patterns of symbolic and material borrowing can be found in the Andes. For example, Justin Jennings and W. Yépez Alvarez (2001) discuss the borrowing of Wari site plans and architectural styles in the Cotahuasi Valley of Peru. They suggest, based on the organization and method of construction, that sites in the valley are "local sites made to look Wari and not Wari sites built by locals" (Jennings and Yépez Alvarez 2001:154) . Other analogs to the Aegean derive from the Titicaca Basin (Stanish 2003) , and from Tiwanakan contexts (Kolata 2003) , where archaeologists have addressed state formation using local models of political-economic alliance.
The extent to which the processes of secondary state formation via interaction resulted in the evolution of "citystates," as opposed to "unitary states" or "territorial states," in other parts of the world remains a question for future research. Because of the theoretical confusion that surrounds the concepts of primary and secondary state formation, it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which primary states are "unitary" in form, and the extent to which first-generation secondary states that form via interaction with more mature complex societies resemble "city-states" (see Feinman 1998; Trigger 2003:29) . Marcus recently noted that early pristine states-Tikal, Monte Albán, Teotihuacán, Moche, Uruk, Egypt-tend to be unitary in Trigger's terms. According to Marcus, "Nothing resembling a group of 'city-states' appeared in those regions until after the early unitary states collapsed" (1998:92) . By contrast, Yoffee has argued that "all the earliest states are not states at all, they are city-states" (1995: 546; see also Yoffee 2005) .
We suggest a fruitful avenue for exploration would be to distinguish between primary states (sensu stricto), which emerged from less complex sociopolitical forms such as chiefdoms, in isolation and with no evidence of interaction with more mature states, and first-generation secondary states, which emerged from local competing corporate groups through interaction with more mature complex societies. The trajectory of state formation in the prehistoric Aegean suggests that local processes of social organization and the nature of secondary interaction have had a significant impact on the historical trajectories and organizational strategies societies assume over time. In particular, the Aegean example suggests that societies that began with larger corporate groups and which interacted indirectly with more complex states were more likely to develop heterarchical-specifically, corporate-systems of organization, whereas societies with smaller corporate groups that interacted more directly with more complex states were more likely to develop hierarchical, network-based systems. 
